It has recently been shown that cryptographic trilinear maps are sufficient for achieving indistinguishability obfuscation. In this paper we develop a method for constructing such maps on the Weil descent (restriction) of abelian varieties over finite fields, including the Jacobian varieties of hyperelliptic curves and elliptic curves. The security of these candidate cryptographic trilinear maps raises several interesting questions, including the computational complexity of a trapdoor discrete logarithm problem.
Introduction
Cryptographic applications of multilinear maps beyond bilinear maps were first proposed in the work of Boneh and Silverberg [3] . However the existence of cryptographically interesting n-multilinear maps for n > 2 remains an open problem. The problem has attracted much attention more recently as multilinear maps and their variants have become a useful tool for indistinguishability obfuscation. Initially coined in the work of Barak et al. [2] , indistinguishability obfuscation is a powerful notion with sweeping applications and far reaching consequences in cryptography. Very recently Lin and Tessaro [11] showed that trilinear maps are sufficient for the purpose of achieving indistinguishability obfuscation (see [11] for references to related works along several lines of investigation). The striking result of Lin and Tessaro [11] has brought the following question into the spotlight: can a cryptographically interesting algebraic trilinear map be constructed? In this paper we develop a method for constructing such trilinear maps on the Weil descent (restriction) of abelian varieties over finite fields, including the Jacobian varieties of hyperelliptic curves and elliptic curves.
A natural place to look for n-multilinear maps for n > 2 isétale cohomology. The challenge however is identifying a promising candidate in the abstract form ofétale cohomology that may have concrete and efficient realization. For example, Huang and Raskind [10] gave n-multilinear generalization of Tate pairing under suitable conditions, for n even. However the generalized n-multilinear Tate pairing naturally takes values in n/2-fold tensor product of µ ℓ , the group of ℓ-th roots of unity, therefore requires solving CDH (computational Diffie-Hellman) problem when n > 2 to consolidate the value of pairing in µ ℓ . In fact Boneh and Silverberg (see Corollary 7.6 in [3] ) gave necessary conditions that seem difficult to satisfy for Galois-equivariant n-multilinear maps taking values in µ ℓ . However Chinburg (at the AIM workshop on cryptographic multilinear maps (2017)) recently demonstrated a trilinear map taking values in µ ℓ can be derived froḿ etale cohomology, and this was the starting point of our line of investigation.
Following up on Chinburg's observation we take the following approach to construct trilinear maps. We start with a principally polarized abelian variety over a finite field and make use of the pairing of the torsion points, as well as the action of endomorphisms on the torsion points to construct a trilinear map. To strengthen the security of the third pairing group, which acts on the second pairing group through endomorphisms, we apply the idea of Weil descent (or Weil restriction) [1, 7] . The security of the trilinear maps constructed in this paper raises several interesting questions, including the computational complexity of a trapdoor discrete logarithm problem.
General idea of construction
Our line of investigation was motivated by an observation of Chinburg that the following map frométale cohomology may serve as the basis of constructing a cryptographically interesting trilinear map:
A is an abelian surface over a finite field F and the prime ℓ = char(F). This trilinear map is the starting point of the following more concrete construction.
Suppose A is a principally polarized abelian variety over a finite field F. Let A * denote the dual abelian variety. Consider A as a variety overF, the algebraic closure of F. Let e ℓ be the pairing between A[ℓ] and A * [ℓ] ( [14] § 16).
In [8] the following trilinear map (α, β, L) → e ℓ (α, ϕ L (β)) was considered, where α, β ∈ A[ℓ], L is an invertible sheaf, and ϕ L be the map A → A * = Pic 0 (A) so that ϕ L (a) = t * a L ⊗ L −1 ∈ Pic 0 (A) for a ∈ A(F) where t a is the translation map defined by by a ( [14] § 1 and § 6).
Note that in the map just described we no longer need to assume that A is of dimension 2.
Below we describe the general idea of constructing a cryptographic trilinear map motivated by the above discussion.
Our goal is to construct an F ℓ -linear map G 1 ×G 2 ×G 3 → G 4 with G i ∼ = Z/ℓZ as groups for i = 1, . . . , 4. The basic requirement is that the discrete logarithm problems on the four groups are computationally hard while the trilinear map is efficient to compute.
The basic setup of our construction can be described as follows. Suppose V is a finite dimensional vector space over F ℓ with an efficiently computable pairing e : V × V → µ ℓ . Let EndV denote the ring of endomorphism of V as an F ℓ -vector space. We choose α, β ∈ V with e(α, β) = 1, and set G i as the group generated by α and β respectively for i = 1 and 2. Let E 0 = {λ ∈ EndV : e(α, λβ) = 1}. We form the third group G 3 as a quotient U 1 /U where U is a submodule of E 0 and U 1 = F ℓ + U . Then we have a trilinear map G 1 × G 2 × G 3 → µ ℓ sending (aα, bβ, c + λ) to e(aα, c + λ(bβ)) = e(α, β) abc for a, b, c ∈ F ℓ and λ ∈ U .
In our construction V = A[ℓ] the set of ℓ-torsion points of an abelian variety A over a finite field. We assume A is simple and principally polarized. Let e : A[ℓ] × A[ℓ] → µ ℓ be a non-degenerate skew-symmetric pairing. An important example is the pairing defined by a principal polarization of A and the canonical pairing between ℓ-power torsion points of A and the dual abelian variety. We will need to make sure that the pairing e is efficiently computable. For now suppose this is the case. We find α, β ∈ A [ℓ] such that e(α, β) = 1, and let G 1 and G 2 be respectively the cyclic groups generated by α and β.
As the first attempt we may take G 3 as a quotient W 1 /W where W 1 = F ℓ +W and W is a submodule of E 0 = {λ ∈ End(A[ℓ]) : e(α, λ(β)) = 1}. And we have a trilinear map G 1 × G 2 × G 3 → µ ℓ sending (aα, bβ, c + W ) to ζ abc where ζ = e(α, β).
We need a representative f ∈ c + W to be specified in such a way that f can be efficiently applied to points in G 2 . On the other hand given f that represents an element of U 1 , we want it to be hard to determine c ∈ F ℓ such that f ∈ c + U . This can be a problem given that the F ℓ -dimension of W 1 is bounded by that of End(A[ℓ]), which is O(g 2 ) where g = dim A. More generally there can be a problem if G 3 is presented explicitly as a quotient U 1 /U where U 1 is a subspace of some F ℓ vector space of polynomially bounded dimension. The reason is that in cryptographic applications we often need to assume that polynomially many samples from U are revealed to the public (hence the adversary). If the dimension of U is polynomially bounded then a basis of U can likely be determined from the sampled elements of U . The basis of U together with 1 form a basis of U 1 . Now the problem of finding c such that f − c ∈ U is easy.
Our strategy in meeting the challenge involves Weil descent (or Weil restriction) [1, 7] . Weil descent was introduced by Frey [6] as a constructive tool in cryptography to disguise elliptic curves. In [5] Dent and Galbraith applied the idea to construct trapdoor DDH (Decision Diffie-Hellman) groups by disguising elliptic curves in order to hide pairings. In our approach, Weil descent is involved for deeper reasons than disguising elliptic curves or abelian varieties, as will be seen in our discussions below. We remark that the construction in [5] is vulnerable to the attacks described in [16] , which depend critically on the addition morphism of an elliptic curve of interest being given in the projective model by homogeneous polynomials. The attacks do not extend to our constructions, where the abelian varieties and maps are given strictly by affine models in affine pieces.
We now give a brief outline of our approach. We start with an abelian variety defined over a extension K of finite field k with d = [K : k], however we proceed to construct the trilinear map on a Weil descentÂ of A. The Weil descentÂ is formed with respect to a secret basis of K over k. NowÂ[ℓ] is isomorphic to A[ℓ] d , so EndÂ[ℓ] contains a submodule isomorphic to M at d (F ℓ ), the algebra of d by d matrices over F ℓ . Utilizing the secret basis we select a set S of N = d O(1) elements λ i ∈ EndÂ[ℓ] such that λ i corresponds to a matrix M i ∈ M at d (F ℓ ). We considerÂ[ℓ] a blinded version of A[ℓ] d , and λ i a blinded version of M i . The maps λ i will be specified in such a way that they can be efficiently applied toÂ [ℓ] while the matrices M i are hidden. Our trilinear map will be derived from a blinded version of the following trilinear map: Let Λ be the F ℓ -algebra generated by N independent variables z 1 , . . . , z N , which is non-commutative for N > 1. Let Λ act onÂ [ℓ] such that z i acts as λ i for i = 1, . . . , N . We have a morphism of algebras λ : Λ → M at d (F ℓ ) such that λ(z i ) = M i , for i = 1, . . . , N , serving as a secret trapdoor map. The following trilinear map can be considered a blinded version of the trilinear map just described:Â
To construct our trilinear map we take G 1 (resp. G 2 ) to be the cyclic group generated by a pointα inÂ[ℓ] (resp.β ∈Â[ℓ]). To construct the third pairing group G 3 , we form a set R 1 of relations of degree 2 on M i (hence λ i ), and publish the set R of relations on z i whose image under λ is R 1 . Let J be the two-sided ideal of Λ generated by R, and let J N be the submodule of J consisting of elements of degree less than or equal to N . With the action of M at d (F ℓ ) on A[ℓ] d blinded by the action of Λ onÂ[ℓ], we define the third pairing group G 3 in terms of modules in Λ of exponential dimensions over F ℓ . We set G 3 = U 1 /U ∼ = Z/ℓZ where U = J N and U 1 = F ℓ + U . For a ∈ F ℓ , a + U ∈ G is encoded by a sparse representative g in a + U . Given g to determine a seems hard as the dimension of U is exponentially large. Using R one can formulate a system of quadratic polynomials in d O(1) variables to determine λ, however solving such a system is too costly. If the secret descent basis is uncovered, then the trapdoor map λ can be efficiently determined, and the discrete logarithm problem on G 3 is reduced via λ to M at d (F ℓ ), which is a vector space of polynomially bounded dimension. Therefore the security of the trilinear map depends on the descent basis being a trapdoor secret, and a methodology is needed to specify maps and functions on a descent variety while protecting the secrecy of the descent basis. This is the subject of investigation in the next section.
Weil descent and secrecy
Let k be a finite field of q elements and let K be an extension of degree d over k. Let θ denote a public basis of K over k consisting of θ 0 , . . . , θ d−1 ∈ K. Every published element of K is explicitly written in this basis. Let u denote a secret basis of K over k consisting of u 0 , . . . , u d−1 ∈ K. The basis u is the basis with respect to which descent objects are defined. The Galois group G(K/k) is generated by the Frobenius automorphism σ such that for
,j≤d−1 . Throughout this section it will be useful to consider the basis u as being secret, hence the maps δ and ρ and the matrices Γ and W are secret as well.
A pointx ∈k d is called a descent point if there is some y ∈k such that
We consider descent points weak in light of Lemma 1.
. ,x n ]. We denote byF the tuple (f i ) d−1 i=0 . If we identifyk dn as the n-fold productk d ×. . .×k d , and by abuse of notation denote δ as the mapk dn →k n such that δ(x 1 , . . . ,x n ) = (δ(x 1 ), . . . , δ(x n )) wherê x 1 , . . . ,x n ∈k d .
PutX =x 1 , . . . ,x n . LetF = (f i ) d−1 i=0 . Then we may write F (δ(X)) = δ(F (X)) = F (X), u .
We have F σi (δ σi (X)) = δ σi (F (X)) = F (X), u σ i .
Consider the map F :k n →k defined by F sending (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈k n to F (x 1 , . . . , x n ). ThenF defines a mapF :k nd →k d sending (X) = (x 1 , . . . ,x n ) ∈ k nd , withx i ∈k d , toF (X).
We have the following commutative diagrams
The map ρ induces an isomorphismV →
Since u is secret, ρ is secret as well, so we may considerV as a blinded version of d−1 i=0 V σi , and consider a rational function φ :V →k as a blinded version of φ ′ = φ • ρ −1 :
i=0 ϕ σi • ρ, and we have the commutative diagram
We consider the mapφ as a blinded version of d−1 i=0 ϕ σi . Moreover we note that
j=0 ϕ σj = ϕ σi • pr i in the sense described above, where pr i denotes the projection to the i-th coordinate.
For the blinding to be effective we want to maintain the secrecy of u while we specifyV , andφ or ϕ σi • δ σi .
A few observations are in order.
1. For α ∈V , if both α and δα are made public, then a linear relation on the u i is revealed: α, u = δα. 2. In our setting we assume polynomially many points fromV can be sampled.
If bothF and F • δ are specified then for sampled α ∈V , let β =F (α), then δβ = δF (α) = F • δ(α), hence a a linear relation on u i is revealed from β and δβ. 3. If F is known and F • δ is specified, then for a sampled α ∈V , F • δ(α) yields linear relation for a set of monomials in u 0 , . . . , u d−1 . Take for example
. Therefore we do not specify bothφ and ϕ• δ (or ϕ σi • δ σi ), and we do not specify ϕ • δ if ϕ is known to the public.
In the following subsections we investigate more fully what and how descent algebraic sets and maps can be specified so as to maintain the secrecy of the descent basis u.
Global descent
We
Since H −F is fixed by σ, we have H −F , u σ j = 0 for j = 0, . . . , d − 1. This implies H =F , given that ρ is invertible. ✷ Global descents and K-global descents are objects that reveal the identity of u, as shown in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 below. Consequently they should not be formed and made public if u is to remain secret. Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 show that whether or not a tuple of polynomials contains any global descent and whether a polynomial contains any K-global descent can be efficiently checked using the basis u.
Proposition 5 characterizes Gl d (k)-action on a global descent, and shows in particular that for a global descentF , the fraction of Γ ∈ Gl d (k) such that ΓF contains any global descent is negligible. These results will be applied in the next subsection to show how descent maps on nontrivial descent varieties can be properly specified so as to keep u secret.
We note that implicit in our notation is the assumption that the association between the variables inx i and x i , for all i, is public information.
A term T with coefficient a is of the form am where a is a constant and m is a monomial. Call a term T vital if it is of degree greater than 1 or of the form
The support of a polynomial is the set of monomials that appear in the polynomial with nonzero coefficient.
For a ∈ K, let Γ a = (γ ij ) be the d by d matrix in Gl d (k) such that au i = d j=1 γ ij u j . Note that the fraction of Γ ∈ Gl d (k) such that Γ = Γ t a for some a ∈ K is in roughly |k| d |k| d 2 , which is negligible.
. , x n ] contains a vital term. Then given F one can efficiently uncover the descent basis.
Proof Write F as the sum of terms F = T i . ThenF = iT i . FromF we can read offT i easily sinceT i have disjoint supports, each determined completely by the corresponding monomial in T i . So it is enough to consider the case where F is a vital term T . Suppose F = T is a vital term and for simplicity suppose T = ax 1 . . . x r for some r ≥ 1, where either r > 1 or r = 1 and K = k(a). Below we discuss how u 1 , . . . , u d can be uncovered fromT .
whereû i = (0, . . . , 1, 0 . . . , 0) ∈ k d consists of all 0 except that the i-th coordinate is 1. So bx 1 can be obtained fromT . It is likely that b generates K over k, in which case from bu j , j = 1, . . . , d, we compute the irreducible polynomial for b, and determine b up to Galois conjugates.
Evaluating bx 1 atx 1 = bu j we obtain b 2 u j . Iterating we obtain b i u j for i = 1, . . . , d−1. From these and the irreducible polynomial of b we can determine u j as a polynomial expression in b. In this fashion the basis u 1 , . . . , u d can be uncovered. ✷ Proposition 2. Given a non-constant K-global descent one can efficiently uncover the descent basis up to a constant factor in K and a Galois conjugate.
The proof is similar for all i so assume without loss of generality i = 0.
Write F as the sum of terms
Suppose for simplicity T = am where m = x 1 . . . x r for some r ≥ 1. Below we discuss how u 1 , . . . , u d can be uncovered fromT .
We have G = a m, u = aδx 1 . . . δx r . Letû i = (0, . . . , 1, 0 . . . , 0) ∈ k d consists of all 0 except that the i-th coordinate is 1. Then δû i = u i . Substitutingû i forx i in G for i = 1, . . . , r we obtain a polynomial h(x 1 ) = au 2 . . . u r δx 1 = bδx 1 where b = au 2 . . . u r . Evaluating h atû i we get bu i for i = 0, . . . , d − 1. Hence we can determine u i /u 0 , i = 0, . . . , d − 1.
We remark that if G = F • δ σi for i > 0, then by a similar argument we can determine u σi j /u σi 0 , j = 0, . .
From the terms of the d polynomials we can determine a set of monomials m 1 , . . . , m t in R so that the support of each f i is contained in the union of the supports of
for some a j ∈ K.
. ,x n ] and the descent basis, one can efficiently check if (f i ) d−1 i=0 contains a global descent.
Proof From the above discussion we are reduced to the case where there is a monomial m such that suppf i ⊂ suppm for all i. The question is whether there is some a ∈ K such that i f i u i = a m, u . This is easy to determine once we have computed i f i u i and m, u . ✷ Let G ∈ K[x 1 , . . . ,x n ]. Let θ : θ 0 , . . . , θ d−1 be a public basis of K/k. Then G can be expressed in the form G =
. , x n ]. By Proposition 3 we can check efficiently whether (g i ) d−1 i=0 contains any global descent. Then we can write G = i G i where suppG i ⊂ suppm i for some monomial m i in x 1 , . . . , x n , and m i are all distinct.
We say that G contains a K-global descent if there is some i such that G i is a K-global descent. That is to say G i = a m i , u σ j for some a ∈ K and 0 ≤ j ≤ d − 1. By computing m i , u σ j we can determine if G = a m i , u σ j for some a ∈ K.
Therefore we have the following. 
x n ] and Γ ∈ Gl d (k). If ΓF contains the global descent of a nonconstant term, then Γ = Γ a for some a ∈ K. If ΓF =Ĝ for some G ∈ R. Then G = aF for some a ∈ K and Γ = Γ t a . Consequently, the fraction of Γ ∈ Gl d (k) such that ΓF contains a global descent of a nonconstant term is negligible.
where Γ a = (γ ij ). Hence aT = Γ t aT . For a ∈ K there is a unique b ∈ k d such that δb = b, u = a. We denote such b asâ. It is easy to see that {T (α) : α ∈ K n } contains d linearly independent vectors since T (α) =T (α). Hence for Γ ∈ Gl d (k), ΓT =T if and only if Γ is the identity matrix. It follows that ΓT = aT if and only if Γ = Γ t a . Now let F = i T i where T i is a term. Let Γ ∈ Gl d (k). ThenF = iT i and ΓF = i ΓT i . If ΓF contains a nontrivial global descent, then ΓT i is a global descent for some i where T i is a non-constant term. This implies ΓT i = aT for some a ∈ K. It follows that Γ = Γ t a . In particular if ΓF =Ĝ then G = aF for some a ∈ K and Γ = Γ a . ✷
Specifying polynomial maps on descent varieties
Throughout this subsection let R = K[x 1 , . . . , x n ] andR = k[x 1 , . . . ,x n ]. Suppose V = Z(F 1 , . . . , F m ), the algebraic set defined by the zeroes of F 1 , . . . , F m ∈ R. Assume that F 1 , . . . , F m are public. We haveV = Z(F 1 , . . . ,F m ). However to specifyV ,F i should not be used, otherwise u may be uncovered, ifF i contains a vital term. We choose random Γ i ∈ Gl d (k) in secret, and check using Proposition 5 that Γ iFi does not contain any global descent. Let Γ iFi = (g ij ) d−1 j=0 for i = 1, . . . , m. ThenV can be specified as the zero set of
We have the following
j=0 contains no global descent and Γ iFi = (g ij ) d−1 j=0 for some random secret Γ i ∈ Gl d (k), for i = 1, . . . , m.
Suppose a map ϕ : V (k) →k can be defined by the restriction of a polynomial H ∈ R to V . Thenφ can be defined by the restriction ofĤ = (h i ) d−1 i=0 toV , with h i ∈R with coefficients in k. However by Proposition 1, if H has a vital term then the global descent (h i ) d−1 i=0 can be used to uncover the descent basis. Therefore we cannot specifyφ by (h i ) d−1 i=0 . Instead we will specifyφ by some
Similarly the map ϕ σi • δ σi :V (k) →k can be defined by the restriction of the K-global descent H σi • δ σi toV . We need to modify H σi • δ σi by adding a polynomial in I(V ) such that the resulting polynomial dose not contain any K-global descent.
The following propositions addresses this issue. In the propositions we need the following assumption: Given any nontrivial monomial m we can efficiently form a polynomial F that vanishes on V such that m appears in F with nonzero constant b.
The assumption is satisfied for example if V = Z(F 1 , . . . , F m ) where F 1 has a nonzero constant term. Then we can take
The assumption is easy to satisfy by a linear change of coordinates. For simplicity we also assume the degrees of F 1 , ..., F m are bounded, as is applicable to our setting of trilinear map construction. However we remark that the the next proposition holds when F i and H are of degrees polynomially bounded.
Let ∆ be a vector of d zero polynomials initially. For each H i , we apply the following procedure. If H i =T where T = a i m i with a i ∈ K, then choose a polynomial F that vanishes on V such that m i appears in F with nonzero constant b. Let Γ be randomly chosen from Gl d (k). Then ∆ is replaced by ∆ + ΓF After the above procedure is applied to all H i , we obtain some
Specifying rational maps on descent varieties
We keep the same notation as before, but suppose now the map ϕ : V (k) →k can be defined by the restriction of a rational function
. , x n ], and a ∈ K * and i ∈ {0, . . . , d − 1}. Then
Hence the first assertion. Since A is fixed by σ, au = Au implies a σi u σ i = Au σ i .
Hence the second assertion, given that ρ is invertible..
. Then for a ∈ K and i = . . . , d − 1, the following holds.
1. For all r ∈ K * ,
2. The function aϕ • δ σi onV can be defined by
contain no global descent and both functions
Proof We have
Then the first assertion follows from Lemma 3. Applying Proposition 7 toF 1 we construct efficiently F ′ 1 , a d-tuple of poly-
can be constructed similarly by applying Proposition 7 toĜ 1 . ✷ By choosing r ∈ K * in Proposition 8 randomly, the coefficient a is blinded. When aϕ σi • δ σi is specified in the form i f ′ i θi i g ′ i θi as in Proposition 8, we say that the specification contains no global descent and the coefficient a is blinded.
To specifyφ, we observe thatφ
For each i, partition the set {h ij : j = 0, . . . , d − 1} into random disjoint subsets S 0 , S 1 ,..., where each S j consists of 2 or 3 functions. Thenφ i = j ψ ij , where ψ ij is the sum of the functions in S j . The function h ij = w ij ϕ σj • δ σj can be expressed in the quotient form as in Proposition 8, so that the expression contains no global descent. As we take the sum of the functions in S j and express the resulting function ψ ij in quotient form again, we can apply Proposition 7 to modify each tuple of polynomials if necessary and make sure that the expression, which is to be used to specify ψ ij , does not contain any global descent. Therefore we have the following
Each S ij contains 2 or 3 functions and for each i, S ij form a random partition of {h ij : j = 0, . . . , d − 1} into subsets of 2 or 3 elements. Moreover ψ ij can be efficiently specified in the form
Linear analysis
Suppose the descentφ of a map ϕ : V → V defined over K is specified. Suppose one point onV is given. Then starting with the given point, one can repeatedly apply the descent mapφ to obtain more points onV . Heuristically speaking we may consider these points as randomly sampled fromV (k).
In this section we investigate the following question: under what conditions could information about u be efficiently computed from polynomially many sampled points α ofV ?
Similarly, suppose φ : V →k is a rational function defined over K, and suppose φ is not public but φ • δ :V →k is specified, so that polynomially many pairs of (α, φ • δ(α)) can be obtained where α ∈V . We also investigate the following question: under what conditions could information about u be efficiently computed from polynomially many pairs (α, φ • δ(α)) (even ifφ and φ • δ are specified properly so that the specifications contain no global descent and none of the sampled points are descent points)?
We begin with some general consideration and definitions. Suppose S is a finite set of monomials in variables x 1 , . . . , x n . Let λ S denote the map from k n →k |S| such that for α ∈k n , λ S (α) is the vector consisting of m(α) where m ranges over all monomials in S.
For A ⊂k n , let ℓ S (A) be the dimension of the linear space of {F ∈k[x 1 , . . . , x n ] : suppF ⊂ S, F (α) = 0, ∀α ∈ A}, and let ω S (A) be the maximal number of lin-
If ω S (A) = |S|, then F is the unique polynomial G with support contained in suppG ⊂ S such that G(α) = F (α) for all α ∈ A. If ω S (A) = |S| − 1, then there is a unique non-zero polynomial F up to a constant multiple such that F (α) = 0 for all α ∈ A.
We now consider as before, the situation of an algebraic variety V defined by a set of polynomials in K[x 1 , . . . , x n ] and its descentV with respect to a basis u of K over k. Suppose a set A of polynomially many sampled points onV is available.
Suppose S is a set of monomials in x 1 , . . . , x n . LetŜ = ∪ m∈S suppm. Let I(V ) be the ideal consisting of polynomials in K[x 1 , . . . , x n ] that vanish at all points of V . Let I S be the set of polynomials in I(V ) with support bounded by S. Let LŜ be the linear space of polynomials in K[x 1 , . . . ,x n ] with support bounded byŜ that vanish at all the sampled points ofV . Hence ℓŜ(A) = dim LŜ.
and ϕ can be defined by the restriction of F •δ toV . Let S = suppF . If ℓŜ(A) = 0 then F • δ is uniquely determined from λŜ(A) and ϕ(A).
Since F • δ is a K-global descent, it reveals substantial information on u by Proposition 2. Lemma 5 leads to the following attack. We need to assume n = O(1). Suppose a map ϕ :V →k is specified in some way but it can actually be defined as F • δ for some F ∈ K[x 1 , . . . , x n ] of bounded degree. Suppose S = suppF . Since we assume deg F is bounded, there are only finitely many choices for S, henceŜ.
Suppose the correct S is being tried. If ℓŜ(A) = 0, then F • δ is the unique polynomial with support bounded byŜ such that F
Consider for example when F = x 1 . Suppose the projection of V to the x 1 -coordinate is surjective. Then the projection ofV to the coordinates inx 1 is also surjective. We have suppF = {x 1 }. In this situation it is likely that ωŜ(A) = d = |Ŝ|, and the attack described above can be mounted.
The attack can be avoided if we make sure that whenever some ϕ :V →k is specified and ϕ can be defined as the restriction of F • δ onV , I S = 0 where S = suppF . More precisely suppose h ∈ I S . Then suppĥ ⊂Ŝ, so ℓŜ(A) > 0.
i=0 , we know that F • δ + a i h i defines the same function onV for all a i ∈ K. Moreover suppĥ ⊂ suppF = suppF • δ. It follows from Lemma 2 and Proposition 5 that for random choices of a i , the probability that i a i h i is a K-global descent is negligible, hence the probability that F • δ + a i h i is a K-global descent is negligible. We have the following:
. Then F • δ + a i h i defines the same function onV for all a i ∈ K. Moreover for random choices of a i , the probability that F • δ + a i h i is a K-global descent is negligible.
The attack described below, linear-term attack, though very limited in scope of success, helps identify some relatively weak cases, such as when V is contained in a hyperplane, or when V is defined by a single polynomial with a linear term. Proof Since S = suppF , the polynomials inF all have support contained in S. Suppose without loss of generality Example 2 Let V be the affine part of the elliptic curve defined by
. If dim LŜ = d thenF can be can be determined from S and the sampled points by Lemma 7. The situation is similar if V is defined by a polynomial that contains a linear term.
Suppose F ∈ I(V ) with a linear term x i . To prevent linear-term attack to discoverF , it is sufficient if
i=0 . Then h i ∈ LŜ ′ ⊂ LŜ for all i. It follows that dim LŜ > d. To summarize we have the following:
Choosing a birational model to prevent linear attacks
To prevent the linear attacks described in the previous subsection, we can form V ′ birational to V over K such that conditions preventing the attacks as described in Lemma 6 and Lemma 8 can be easily satisfied.
Consider a rational map λ :k n →k n+1 sending (
We assume b i are randomly chosen from K, so that with high probability no sampled points lie on the exceptional hyperplane
Consider a random general linear map µ :k n+1 →k n+1 given by an n + 1 by n + 1 invertible matrix over B over K. Let L 1 ,...L n+1 be linear forms in
Note that L i L j likely involves all x r x s with randomly chosen µ, and more gen-
. This is useful in preventing the attacks described in Lemma 5 and Lemma 7 as we explain below.
We assume that I(V ) does not contain any linear polynomial. In forming V ′ we assume that with randomly chosen µ that every polynomial in the defining set of V ′ is dense at least for some degree i > 1, in the sense that the support of the polynomial contains all monomials in x 1 , . . . , x n+1 of degree i. Let I ′ = I(V ′ ) and I ′ S denote the subset of I ′ with support bounded by S where S is a set of monomials in x 1 , . . . , x n+1 . If S contains all monomials of degree i for some i ≥ 2, then I ′ S = 0 as it contains for example R ′ x i−2 1 . Hence the attack in Lemma 7 can be prevented if every polynomial in I ′ of bounded degree with a linear term is dense for some degree at least 2.
. . , L n (x)) and G ′ = G(L 1 (x), . . . , L n (x)), and both F ′ and G ′ are likely dense. Suppose F ′ (resp. G ′ ) is dense for degree i ≥ 2. Then I ′ S = 0 where S = suppF ′ (resp. S = suppG ′ ). Hence the attack in Lemma 5 can be prevented when ϕ ′ • δ is specified by specifying F ′ • δ and G ′ • δ.
are dense in some degree at least 2, then the attack in Lemma 5 can be prevented when F ′ i • δ and G ′ i • δ (and their Galois conjugates) are specified in order to specifyφ ′ .
In our situation there will be a finite set of polynomials involved in defining various rational functions on V that are of interest to trilinear map construction. By choosing random µ we check and make sure that every such polynomial F is such that the corresponding F ′ = F (L 1 (x), . . . , L n (x)) is dense for some degree i ≥ 2.
Summary on specification of descent maps and functions
We now summarize our discussion from § 2.1 to § 2.5.
We say that an algebraic set V defined over K is safe (for specification of the descent of V ) if the following holds: (1) I(V ) contains no linear polynomial, and (2) if F ∈ I(V ) contains a linear term x i then I S = 0 where S = suppF − {x i }. Condition (1) is easy to satisfy unless V is a linear variety. Condition (2) is likely to hold after a random birational transformation as described in § 2.5. These conditions prevent the linear-term attack described in Lemma 7 using the sampled points onV .
For F ∈ K[x 1 , . . . , x n ], let S F be the support of F . We say that F is safe if I SF = 0. When F is safe the linear attack (Lemma 5) does not apply when
x n ] such that ϕ can be defined by F/G on V , F and G are safe.
When a random birational transformation ι as described in § 2.5 is applied to V , the rational function ϕ • ι −1 which replaces ϕ is likely safe if ϕ is defined as the quotient of two polynomials of degree at least 2.
The specification of descent maps and descent functions with blinding multiples (φ and aϕ σi • δ σi ) all boil down to specifying functions onV →k of the form rF σi • δ σi where r is secret random and F ∈ K[x 1 , . . . , x n ] may be known. By Proposition 8, rF σi •δ σi can be specified as
i=0 contains no global descent and
. The map aϕ σi • δ σi is specified once we specify arF σi • δ σi and rG σi • δ σi where r ∈ K * is secret and randomly chosen. We say that aϕ σi • δ σi is properly specified if arF σi • δ σi and rG σi • δ σi are properly specified, where r ∈ K * is secret and randomly chosen, such that ϕ = F/G on V , we say that a is blinded in the specification.
When the descent mapφ is specified in the manner as described in Proposition 9, we say that it is properly specified.
Mixed descent
Let ϕ : V × V →k be a rational function that can be defined by F (x, y)/G(x, y) where F and G are polynomials in x = x 1 , . . . , x n and y = y 1 , . . . , y n . We now consider descent function determined by ϕ onV ×V ′ whereV andV ′ are descent varieties of V formed with respect two different secret bases. We discuss how the method for properly specifying descent functions can be naturally adapted to this situation.
In this setting, we fix a public basis θ 1 , . . . , θ d of K/k, a private basis u = u 0 , . . . , u d−1 of K/k, and another private basis u ′ = u ′ 0 , . . . , u ′ d−1 of K/k. Let δ denote the basic descent mapk d →k with respect to u, and ρ the bijective linear mapk d →k d determined by δ.
Let δ ′ denote the basic descent mapk d →k with respect to u ′ , and ρ ′ the bijective linear mapk d →k d determined by δ ′ .
LetV denote the descent of V with respect to the basis u. LetV ′ denote the descent of V with respect to the basis u ′ . Suppose A is the set of sampled points onV and A ′ is the set of sampled points onV ′ .
Then ϕ • (δ σi , δ ′ σi ) is a descent functionV ×V ′ →k that can be defined by
We say that a polynomial F (x, y) is safe if I S1(F ) = 0 where S 1 (F ) is the support of F (x, y) as a polynomial in x, and I S2(F ) = 0 where S 2 (F ) is the support of F (x, y) as a polynomial in y.
Suppose F is safe. We expect F (x, δ ′ β) to be safe for randomly sampled β fromV ′ . Similarly we expect F (δα, y) to be safe for randomly sampled α from V .
We say a rational function ϕ :
Performing a birational transformation as in § 2.5 if necessary we may assume F and G are dense in both x and y, hence the above conditions are likely to hold for F and G of degree at least 2 in x and in y.
We discuss how F ′ can be properly specified as a functionV ×V ′ →k. The method can also be applied to G ′ . We consider the case F ′ = F (δx, δŷ) in the discussion below. The general case
, a mixed K-global descent with respect to u and u ′ . From this form of F ′ one easily obtains a i m i (δx)m ′ i (δ ′ŷ ), from which essential information on u may be obtained by specializingŷ to random β ∈ A ′ , similarly essential information on u ′ may be obtained by specializingx to random α ∈ A. So in specifying the function onV ×V ′ we want to modify F ′ into some H where H − F ′ vanishes onV ×V ′ and H does not contain any K-global descent with respect to u or u ′ even after specialization at sampled points. This can be achieved by adapting the method described in the proof of Proposition 7.
Let
As in Proposition 7 we find polynomials F i (x) ∈ I(V ) containing a term m i and F ′ i (y) ∈ I(V ) containing a term m ′ i . We modify the polynomial
After the modification the polynomial takes the form i N i N ′ i with N i = Γ t im i , u where m i is a monomial in x, Γ i is a random sum of matrices in Gl d (k) except for at most one matrix of the form Γ a where a ∈ K * and Γ a u = au. Hence Γ i is most likely not of the form Γ b for some b ∈ K * , in which case N i is not a K-global descent with respect to u. Similarly N i is unlikely a K-global descent with respect to u σ j and u ′ σj for j = 0, . . . , d − 1.
i is most likely not a K-global descent with respect to u σ j and u ′ σj for j = 0, . . . , d − 1. .
We have proved the following:
. , x n and y = y 1 , . . . , y n . For i = 0, . . . , d − 1, we can efficiently construct
i is a d by d matrix with entries in k and N ′ i is not a K-global descent with respect to u σ j and u ′ σj for j = 0, . . . , d − 1.
We say that the descent function F σi • (δ σi , δ ′ σi ) in Proposition 10 is properly specified by G. Note that when
where A j is a heuristically random sum of matrices in Gl d (k), hence A t jm j , u is unlikely a global K-global descent with respect to u. Similar observation can be made concerning specialization at α ∈V .
Blinding by Weil descent
In this subsection we develop a method for blinding maps using Weil descent, to be employed later in our trilinear map construction. Let V ⊂k n be an algebraic set defined as the zero set Z(S) of a finite set S of polynomials in K[x 1 , . . . , x n ]. LetV ⊂k nd be the descent of V , defined as the zero set Z(Ŝ) whereŜ contains all polynomials inF for every F ∈ S.
Suppose m : V × V → V is a rational map defined over K. Let M be a d × d (0, 1)-matrix such that each row has at most two nonzero entries, that is, entries with 1. For row i, let i 1 and i 2 be such that 0
We say that the map ϕ is blinded by Ψ with respect to u.
We have the following commutative diagram:
Let A = (a ij ) 0≤i,j≤d−1 be a d by d matrix. For I ⊂ {0, . . . , d − 1}, let A I = (a ij ) 0≤i≤d−1,j∈I , and A I = (a ij ) i∈I,0≤j≤d−1 .
Suppose A and B are two d by d matrices. If I = {i}, then A I B I = (c rs ) 0≤r,s≤d−1 with c rs = a ri b is , the tensor product of the i-th column of A and the i-th row of B. In general, A I B I = i∈I C(i) where C(i) is the tensor product of the i-th column of A and the i-th row of B.
Let Ω a,b = W I a,b Γ I a,b , and Ω r,a,b be the r-th row of W I a,b Γ I a,b . We assume
Consequently, Ψ can be specified to the public by specifyingm, and making public E, and Ω a,b for every (a, b) ∈ E.
where
Some observations
1. If |I a,b | = 1, then u σ i can be determined up to constant factors (though i is not known), then U/u 0 can be determined. Therefore to keep u secret, |I a,b | should be greater than. Suppose d O(1) many maps like ϕ are blinded with respect to u. We are led to the following:
Problem: A basis u of K over k is hidden. As before let Γ be the matrix whose i-th row is u σ i for i = 0, . . . , d − 1. Let W = Γ −1 . A set of d O(1) matrixes is given, each of which is W I Γ I for some secret I ⊂ {0, . . . , d − 1} with |I| = Θ(d c ) for some positive constant c < 1. Can u be determined efficiently?
Specifying maps on abelian varieties
A semi-algebraic set defined over K ink n is of the form V (F 1 , . . . , F m ) − V (G 1 , . . . , G r ) where F i , G j ∈ K[x 1 , . . . , x n ] for all i, j. We may assume that an abelian variety A can be described in terms of affine pieces. As we will see in § 5 when we take A to be the Jacobian variety of a hyperelliptic curve, we may assume A(k) = ∪ i V i as a disjoint union, withe each V i an algebraic subset ofk n for some n. Moreover there is a unique V i , say i = 0, with dim V 0 = dim A. We call V 0 the principal site for A.
The addition morphism m on V i ×V j can be described in terms of a collection maps m α : U α → A where U α is a semi-algebraic subset of V i × V j , and there is a unique α such that U α is of the same dimension as V i × V j , which we call the principal site for m on V i × V j . The principal site for m on V 0 × V 0 is the unique site of the same dimension as A × A, and is called the principal site for m.
Similarly, the doubling morphism, sending P ∈ A(k) to 2P , has a principal site on V i for all i, and the principal site for the doubling morphism on V 0 is called the principal site for the morphism.
A pointP ∈Â(k) is said to be in a pure site ofÂ if there is some V i such that δ σjP ∈ V σj i for all j. It is in a pure site for the doubling morphism if if there is some V i such that for all j, δ σjP is in the principal site of V σj i for σ j -conjugate of the doubling morphism. SupposeP 1 ,P 2 ∈Â(k). Then (P 1 ,P 2 ) is in a pure site form if there is some V i × V j such that (δ σrP 1 , δ σrP 2 ) is in the principal site of m σr on V σr i × V σr j for all r. If i = j = 0, then it is said to be in the principal site form.
SupposeP 1 ,P 2 ∈Â(k). Suppose (P 1 ,P 2 ) belongs to a pure site form. Then there is m α : U α → V , (δ σiP 1 , δ σiP 2 ) ∈ U α for all i, and U α is the principal site for m on some V j × V r . In this case,m(P 1 ,P 2 ) =m α (P 1 ,P 2 ).
More generally, if (δ σiP
If (P 1 ,P 2 ) belongs to a pure site form, then α i = α for all i, for some α, I α = {0, . . . , d−1}, Ω α is the identity matrix, and we getm(P 1 ,P 2 ) =m α (P 1 ,P 2 ) as already discussed. If (P 1 ,P 2 ) belongs to a mixed site form, then the partition of {0, . . . , d − 1} into I α 's, together with Ω α and m α specifies the mixed site containing (P 1 ,P 2 ). We note the difference between this situation and the situation that arises in § 2.8 is that in this case I α also needs to be made public, consequently Ω α reveals a linear relation among W (i) Γ (i) , i = 0, . . . , d − 1. Therefore the number of specified mixed sites should be carefully limited so that the publicized set of (I α , Ω α ) yields a small number of relations. In our situation, it is enough to focus on the principal sites forÂ,m and the doubling morphism, hence there is no need to publicize any mixed site. In this case we may focus on the principal site V = V 0 of A, consider m : V × V → V and the doubling map V → V as rational maps, and focus on their descent maps and functions overV .
A trapdoor discrete logarithm problem
We apply the blinding method of § 2.8 to define a trapdoor discrete-logarithm problem.
As in § 2.8, let V ⊂k n be an algebraic set defined by a finite set of polynomials in K[x 1 , . . . , x n ]. In the current context we assume that V describes an affine piece of an abelian variety A defined over K. We assume that A[ℓ] ⊂ V (K).
Suppose m : V × V → V is a rational map defined over K that describes the addition morphism of A when restricted to V .
We assume the map m, including the algebraic set V , is public,but the basis u is secret. The descentm :V ×V →V is formed in secret using u, and properly specified to the public, so that the specification does not contain any global descent and the entries in the matrix W = ρ −1 are blinded, following the methods in Proposition 6, Proposition 7 and Proposition 9.
We consider (0, 1)-matrices M with the property that there are exactly two nonzero entries (i, i 1 ) and (i, i 2 ) for row i, for i = 0, . . Let for i = 1, . . . , N , ϕ i = ϕ Mi be the map determined by M i and let Ψ i be the map onV (K) blinding ϕ i , as described in § 2.8. By Proposition 11 Ψ i can be specified to the public by specifyingm, and making public E Mi , and Ω a,b for every (a, b) ∈ E M . The property that |I Mi,a,b | = Θ(d ǫ ) is to make sure that the blinding of ϕ i is strong so that M i is hidden.
Find α, β ∈ A(K) [ℓ] such that e ℓ (α, β) = 1. Then α and β are not in the same cyclic group. Choose random
We impose the condition that for some i, j, x i α + y i β = x j α + y j β. This is to make sure that D β is not a descent point, that is, there is no γ
i=0 . Let M 0 be the identity matrix and correspondingly ϕ 0 = 1. Let Λ be the non-commutative F ℓ -algebra generated by N variables z 1 , . . . , z N . Let λ : Λ → EndÂ(K)[ℓ] be the algebra morphism defined by λz i = Ψ i for i = 1, . . . , N .
Let ω : Λ → M at d (F ℓ ) be the algebra morphism defined by ω(z i ) = M i for i = 1, . . . , N .
Forming quadratic relations
To form a quadratic relation we choose random a ij and compute the matrix 
The discrete logarithm problem
Let J be the two-sided ideal of Λ generated by R.
For i > 0, let J i be the submodule of J consisting of elements of degree less than or equal to i.
The discrete logarithm problem on G is formally the problem of computing the map G → Z/ℓZ sending a + U ∈ G to a for a ∈ F ℓ .
We specify the discrete logarithm problem on G as follows.
1. The set R is made public, and J is specified as the two sided ideal of Λ generated by R.
a + U ∈ G is encoded by a sparse representative in a + U . More precisely, to encode a, one follows the procedure described in § 3.3 to construct a sparse element f ∈ U with |suppf | = O(N 2 ). Let g = i a i m i = f + a, where m i are monomials of degree no greater than N . Then g is an encoding of a. 3. The discrete logarithm problem on G is: Given a sparse g ∈ U 1 , to determine a ∈ F ℓ such that g ∈ a + U .
The morphism ω is a trapdoor map since ωg = aI where I is the identity matrix.
The discrete logarithm as specified above is the generic version that does not involve the abelian variety A, and the maps Ψ i onÂ[ℓ]. In this generic version the first condition in forming M i is not needed.
When the maps Ψ i are specified together with D β ∈Â[ℓ], public identity testing for G is made possible: for g ∈ U 1 , g ≡ 0 mod U if and only if λ(g)(D β ) = 0. We call this version trapdoor discrete logarithm on G with public identity testing.
Constructing random sparse elements in J N
We call an element f ∈ Λ s-sparse if |suppf | ≤ s. We describe a method to construct an O(N 2 )-sparse f ∈ J N randomly with f = N −1 i=1 f i so that 1. f i ∈ J i+1 for i = 1, . . . , N − 1, 2. suppf i consists of monomials of degree i − 1, i, i + 1 for i = 1, . . . , N − 1, 3. |suppf i ∩ suppf i+1 | ≥ N c for some constant 0 < c < 1, for i = 1, . . . , N − 2.
To construct f the first step is to form f 1 as a random F ℓ linear combination of R 1 , . . . , R N . Then proceed inductively to form f i for i = 2, . . . , N −1. Suppose f i−1 has been determined. To form f i we do the following.
Form R
2. For j = 1, . . . , N , choose two random monomials m 1j and m 2j such that deg m 1j m 2j = i − 1, and set f 
Trilinear maps involving Weil descent

Constructing the trilinear map
To construct a trilinear map, we take an abelian variety A of dimension g defined over a finite field K of extension degree d over a finite field k, and consider the descentÂ of A with respect to a basis u : u 1 , . . . , u d of K over k. We assume that A is known to the public, and a public basis θ 0 , . . . , θ d−1 of K over k is used to specify elements of K. The basis u is secret. The descentÂ andm are specified to the public in such a way that the specification does not contain any global descent. For simplicity assume log ℓ, d and log |k| are linear in the security parameter n, whereas g = O(1).
The trilinear map will take the form
, G 2 is a cyclic group generated by a point D β ∈Â(K)[ℓ], and G 3 is a cyclic group with a trapdoor as discussed in § 3.
As in § 3, we choose a set of N = O(d 2 ) many (0, 1)-matrices M 1 , . . . , M N that span M at d (F ℓ ), so that each M = M i has the following properties:
1. There are exactly two nonzero entries (i, i 1 ) and (i, i 2 ) for row i, for i = 0, . . . , d − 1.
Let
Let Λ be the non-commutative F ℓ -algebra generated by N variables z 1 , . . . , z N . Let λ : Λ → EndÂ(K)[ℓ] be the algebra morphism defined by λz i = Ψ i for i = 1, . . . , N .
We have the following commutative diagram: 
where e i = e σi ℓ . Note thatê is the blinded version of the pairing d−1 i=0 e i on
such that e ℓ (α, β) = 1. Then α and β are not in the same cyclic group. Choose random x i , y i ∈ F ℓ such that and let
We impose the condition that for some i, j, x i α + y i β = x j α + y j β. This is to make sure that D α is not a descent point, that is, there is no
We impose the condition that for some i, j, Let G 1 be the group generated by D α . Let G 2 be the group generated by
The sparsity constraint is to make sure that the map γ can be efficiently executed,so that the trilinear map can be efficiently computed, assuming the pairing is efficiently computable.
We note that if the two secret descent bases were identical then the published pairingê together with some Ψ i can be used to induce self pairing on G 1 . Namely ifê(D α , Ψ i (D α )) = 1, then we have an efficiently computable pairing G 1 × G 1 → µ ℓ , hence G 1 would not satisfy DDH assumption. Similar observation applies to G 2 . As for G 3 , neither the pairingê nor the trilinear map naturally induce a self pairing on the group.
In order for the cyclic groups G 1 and G 3 to satisfy the DDH assumption, we can construct the two groups on two descentÂ andÂ ′ of A with respect two secret bases. Then the pairingê :Â[ℓ] ×Â ′ [ℓ] → µ ℓ cannot be used to define a self pairing on G 1 or G 2 directly.
In this setting, we fix a public basis θ 1 , . . . , θ d of K/k, a private basis u 1 , . . . , u d of K/k, and another private basis u ′ 1 , . . . , u ′ d of K/k. Let δ denote the basic descent mapk d →k with respect to u 1 , . . . , u d , and ρ the bijective linear mapk d →k d determined by δ.
Let δ ′ denote the basic descent mapk d →k with respect to u ′ 1 , . . . , u ′ d , and ρ ′ the bijective linear mapk d →k d determined by δ ′ .
LetÂ denote the descent of A with respect to the basis u 1 , . . . , u d . LetÂ ′ denote the descent of A with respect to the basis u ′ 1 , . . . , u ′ d .
We publish the following 1. D ′ α and D β where D ′ α is the image of D α under the natural isomorphism betweenÂ andÂ ′ determined by ρ ′−1 ρ, 2. the program for computing the descentm of the addition m onÂ, the program for computing the descentm ′ of the addition m onÂ ′ , 3. the programs for computing Ψ i , i = 1, . . . , N , 4. the set R of relations
We also need to specifyê such that it is efficiently computable in the public while u and u ′ remain secret. We will show how this can be done when A is the Jacobian variety of a hyperelliptic curve in the next section.
Jacobian varieties of hyperelliptic curves
We consider the Jacobian variety J = J C of a hyperelliptic curve C of genus g with an affine model
Again let d = [K : k], and for simplicity assume log ℓ, d and log |k| are linear in the security parameter n, whereas g = O(1). All computations described below will take time polynomially bounded in log ℓ, d, log |k|, and g O(g) , hence polynomially bounded in n.
We follow [4] and consider the birational model for representing points of J by reduced divisors on C. Following [4] , a semireduced divisor is of the form
A reduced divisor is a semireduced divisor D with r ≤ g, represented by a pair of polynomials (a, b) where deg b < deg a ≤ g and a is monic.
To describe the sites of the Jacobian variety, let us consider briefly polynomial division. Let f and g be polynomials of degrees n and m respectively. Then f = qg + r where deg q = n − m and deg r ≤ m − 1. Let (f i ) n i=0 , (g i ) m i=0 , (q i ) n−m i=0 and (r i ) m−1 i=0 be the coefficient vectors of f, g, q, r respectively. Then q n−m−i can be expressed as a rational function in f i 's and g i 's of degree i + 1, for i = 0, . . . , n − m; and r i can be expressed as a rational function of degree n − m + 2 for i = 0, . . . , m − 1. When g is monic then q n−m−i can be expressed as a polynomial in f i 's and g i 's of degree i + 1, for i = 0, . . . , n − m; and r i can be expressed as a polynomial of degree n − m + 2 for i = 0, . . . , m − 1.
A point on J is represented by a reduced divisor div(a, b) where a is monic, deg a ≤ g and deg b ≤ deg a − 1, satisfying f ≡ b 2 mod a. The last condition can be expressed by demanding the remainder of the division of f − b 2 by a to be 0. From the discussion above this translates into deg a polynomial conditions of degree O(g), namely by setting the deg a many remainder polynomials to zero. We have g + 1 disjoint affine pieces V i , i = 0, . . . , g, where V i corresponds to the case where deg a = g − i. Each piece is an algebraic subset ofk 2g+1 . A K-rational point of J corresponds to a K-rational pair (a, b), which can be naturally identified with a K-rational point in K 2g+1 . The principal site of J is V 0 , corresponding to the case deg a = g.
The addition law can be described in terms of two algorithms: composition of semireduced divisors and reduction of a semireduced divisor to a reduced divisor [4] .
Suppose D 1 = div(a 1 , b 1 ) and D 2 = div(a 2 , b 2 ) are two semireduced divisors. Then D 1 + D 2 = D + (h) where D = div(a, b) is semireduced and h(x) is a function, and a, b and h can be computed by a composition algorithm. We have
where h 1 , h 2 and h 3 are polynomials and h is monic.
) is a semireduced divisor with deg a > g. Then a reduction when applied to D results in a smaller semi-
We have deg a ′ ≤ deg a − 2. If D 1 and D 2 are two reduced divisors then after a composition we get a semireduced divisor of degree at most 2g. So in O(g) iterations of reductions we eventually obtained a reduced divisor D 3 and a function h so that D 1 + D 2 = D 3 + (h). We call this computation addition: on input reduced divisors D 1 = div(a 1 , b 1 ) and D 2 = div(a 2 , b 2 ), a reduced divisor D 3 = div(a 3 , b 3 ) together with a function h are constructed, so that D 1 + D 2 = D 3 + (h).
Note that the function h is of the form h 1 h 2 where h 1 (x) is a polynomial monic of degree less than 2g resulting from the composition step, and h 2 is the product of O(g) functions of the form y−β(x) a ′ (x) , each resulting from a reduction step, where the degrees of β(x) and a ′ (x) are less than 2g.
We define the degree of a rational function f /g, where f and g are polynomials, to be the maximum of deg f and deg g.
We observe that the basic operations in composition and reduction are polynomial addition, multiplication and division (to obtain quotient and remainder). The addition of two reduced divisors involves O(g) polynomial divisions. Each division leads to O(g) branches of computation depending on the degree of the remainder. The degrees of the coefficients of quotient and remainder polynomials as polynomials in the coefficients of a 1 , b 1 , a 2 and b 2 increase by a factor of O(g) with each division. From a routine analysis we see that the map m on V i × V j can be divided into g O(g) sites. Each case is a rational map defined by O(g) functions of degree g O(g) in the coefficients of a 1 , b 1 , a 2 , b 2 , and the semi-algebraic set for the site is defined by g O(1) polynomials of degree g O(g) in a 1 , b 1 , a 2 and b 2 .
For an unknown reduced divisor D = div(a, b) we let x D denote the list of variables representing the coefficients of a and b. From the addition algorithm and the analysis above, we see that the coefficients of h 1 (x) and each a ′ (x) and β(x) are rational functions of degree g O(g) in x D1 and x D2 .
At the principal site of m on V i × V j , h 1 = 1, hence h is the product of O(g) functions of the form y−β(x) a ′ (x) , each resulting from a reduction step, where the degrees of β(x) and a ′ (x) are less than 2g, and their coefficients are rational functions of degree g O(g) in x D1 and x D2 .
Similarly at the principal site of the doubling map 2 on V i , if we write 2D = D ′ + (h) where D is a reduced divisor at the site and D ′ is the resulting reduced divisor. Then h is the product of O(g) functions of the form y−β(x) a ′ (x) , where the degrees of β(x) and a ′ (x) are less than 2g, with coefficients being rational functions of degree g O(g) in x D .
Summarizing our discussion so far, we have the following. In pairing computation we will need to evaluate the function h on reduced divisors. To this end it is sufficient to consider functions that are either polynomials in x, or of the form y − β(x) where β(x) is a polynomial in x.
Let ν ∞ denote the valuation on the function field of C at infinity. Then ν ∞ (x) = −2 and ν ∞ (y) = −(2g+1), and x g y −1 is a local uniformizing parameter for ν ∞ .
For functions f and g we write
We assume that the hyperelliptic curve is given by an equation y 2 − f (x) where deg f = 2g+1 and f is monic. In this case if ν ∞ (x a y b ) = 0 then x a y b (∞) = 1. This is because ν ∞ (x) is even and ν ∞ (y) is odd, so b must be even. Put b = 2c. Then ν ∞ (x a y b ) = 0 implies a + c(2g + 1) = 0. We have
We have the following.
Lemma 9. 1. We assume that the hyperelliptic curve is given by an equation
Consider now the evaluation of h, which is either a polynomial in x or of the form y − β(x) where β(x) is a polynomial in x, at the affine part of a reduced divisor.
. We can construct by the fundamental theorem of symmetric polynomials a polynomial S(t, z) where t = t 0 , . . . , t 2g−1 and z = z 1 , . . . , z g , such that
where s i (z) is the i-th symmetric expression in z 1 , . . . , z g (s 1 (z) = z 1 + . . . + z g for example). The polynomial S has degree O(g) in t and degree O(g) in z.
Denote by c(f ) = (a 0 , . . . , a m , 0, . . . , 0) the (2g)-vector consisting of the coefficients of f padded with 0's if necessary.
Let ρ(x) ∈ K[x] of degree r ≤ g and monic. Let γ 1 , . . . , γ r be the roots of ρ and let γ = γ 1 , . . . , γ r . Then
Let s(ρ) = (s 1 (γ), . . . , s r (γ), 0, . . . , 0), the g-vector consisting of s i (γ) and padded with 0 if necessary.
We have
.
We have proved the following. Let D 1 = div(a 1 , b 1 ) be a reduced divisor. Then 2D 1 = D ′ + (h) where D ′ is a reduced divisor and h is a function. By Proposition 12 we know that h is of the form h 1 h 2 where h 1 ∈ K[x] is of degree less than 2g and
where β i (x) and a ′ i (x) are polynomials in x, and deg β i and the number of i are both less than 2g. Put h 3 (x) = i a ′ i (x). Then deg h 3 (x) = O(g 2 ). Let h + (x D ) denote the function h as it applies to evaluate the positive part D + of a reduced divisor D = div(a, b). Then by Lemma 10,
At each site of the doubling map, we have, by Proposition 12,
i and µ ij are rational functions of degree g O(g) in x D1 . Since h 1 is monic, (h 1 ) ∞ = 1, and we have
Let λ(x D1 ) denote the sequence of λ i (x D1 ) and similarly λ ′ (x D1 ) denote the sequence of λ ′ i (x D1 ), and µ(x D ) denote the sequence of µ ij (x D1 ). Then h ∞ can be determined from λ ′ and µ.
Then
, and since S has degree O(g) in each of the variable, it follows that A is polynomial in x D of degree O(g 3 ) and rational in x D1 of degree g O(g) , and B is polynomial in x D of degree O(g 3 ) and rational in x D1 of degree g O(g) . Therefore each coefficient of h + can be expressed as a rational function of degree g O(g) in x D1 .
We have proved the following: At each site of the doubling map, we have
and h ∞ can be determined from λ ′ (x D1 ) and µ(x D1 ).
We denote by h D1 the function h in Proposition 13, which is constructed by the addition algorithm.
Pairing computation
We keep the same notation as the last section and consider the pairing on J[ℓ] defined by Weil reciprocity.
If a reduced divisor D represents an ℓ-torsion point, then ℓD is the divisor of a function f . Given two reduced divisors D 1 and D 2 that represent two ℓ-torsion points, we define the pairing to be
where ℓD i = (f i ) for i = 1, 2. Let D be a reduced divisor representing a point on J. Then 2D = (h D ) + D 1 for some reduced divisor D 1 . For pairing computation we consider h D as a function that can evaluate at divisors of degree zero. Thus on input a reduced divisor D ′ = div(a ′ , b ′ ), h D (D ′ ) ∈k. We note that any ah D with a ∈ K * defines the same function on divisors of degree zero.
Suppose D is a ℓ-torsion divisor. We recall how to efficiently construct h such that ℓD = (h) through the squaring trick [12, 13] .
Apply addition to double D, and get
where D 1 is reduced. Inductively, we have H i such that
with D i reduced. Apply addition to double D i and get
with D i+1 reduced. Then
where H i+1 = H 2 i h Di . Write ℓ = i a i 2 i with a i ∈ {0, 1}. There are O(log ℓ) non-zero a i . So apply O(log ℓ) many more additions and we can construct h such that ℓD = (h). Therefore if D 1 and D 2 are two reduced divisors, we can construct in this way f 1 and f 2 such that (f i ) = ℓD i for i = 1, 2. Moreover if we write
2 ) = 0. Now it follows from Lemma 9 that
where e i denotes the pairing defined by Weil reciprocity on J σi .
Lemma 11. LetD ∈Ĵ(K). Suppose 2D =D ′ as points onĴ(K). Then
Proof We have δ σiD = (δD σ−i ) σi with δD σ−i ∈ J(K). Moreover since 2D =D ′ inĴ(K), we have 2δ σiD = δ σiD′ , and it follows that 2δD σ−i = δD ′ σ−i , as points on J. Therefore as reduced divisors on C, we have
It follows that
, and
i and µ ij are rational functions of degree g O(g) in x D . Since (h 3 ) ∞ and (β i ) ∞ are determined respectively from their leading coefficients of the polynomials h 3 and β i , hence they are determined by λ ′ i (x D ) and µ ij (x D ).
).
It follows that (h σi δD σ −i ) ∞ can be determined from (λ ′ j ) σi (δ σiD ) and (µ jk ) σi (δ σiD ), which, as functions inD.
We have proved the following.
Let D = div(a, b) and D ′ = div(a ′ , b ′ ) be reduced divisors. By Proposition 13, we have
rational in x D1 of degree g O(g) , and B is polynomial in x D of degree O(g 3 ) and rational in x D1 of degree g O(g) . LetD 1 ∈Â(K) andD 2 ∈Â ′ (K). Then
where A 1 and B 1 are polynomials in x D and x D ′ . Let ϕ : J × J →k be the rational function defined by A 1 /B 1 . Then We have
Lemma 13. Let A and B be polynomials as defined in Proposition 13. Write A/B in the form
where A 1 and B 1 are polynomials of degree O(g 3 ) in x D and degree g O(g) in x D ′ . Let ϕ : J × J →k be the rational function defined by
PutD 0 =D. Suppose inductively 2D j =D j+1 . Inductively, we have H with δD j+1 reduced. Then
where H
There are O(log ℓ) non-zero a i . So apply O(log ℓ) many more additions and we can construct H
In summary, to specify the program forê, it is enough to specify O(g 2 d) many descent functions with blinded constant factors of a set C of O(g 2 ) rational functions on J. The set C contains the following functions
The following descent functions are specified:
The associated descent functions with blinded constant factors can all be specified properly.
For g > 1, the degrees of the functions f ∈ C are all greater than 1. Perform a birational transformation ι as described in § 2.5 if necessary, we can replace these functions f ∈ C by functions f • ι −1 which are likely dense for some degree at least 2, hence are immune to the linear attack described in § 2.4. Moreover f • ι −1 is secret since ι is secretly chosen.
We have proved the following: Theorem 1. Efficient computation for the blinded pairingê ℓ onĴ[ℓ] can be properly specified, such that the specification does not contain any global descent. More precisely, to specify the program forê, it is enough to specify O(g 2 d) many descent functions with blinded constant factors of a set C of O(g 2 ) rational functions on J. For g > 1, the degrees of the functions f ∈ C are all greater than 1. Suppose by performing a birational transformation ι as described in § 2.5 if necessary, and the functions f • ι −1 , which replaces f ∈ C, are dense for some degree at least 2. Then the specification is safe from the linear attack described in § 2.4. Moreover f • ι −1 for f ∈ C is secret since ι is secretly chosen.
The elliptic curve case
In this section we specialize the trilinear map construction to the case where the dimension of the abelian variety A is one, namely the elliptic curve case. We take the abelian variety to be an elliptic curve E defined over K. Suppose the characteristic of K is not 2 or 3, and E is given
A reduced divisor (x − a, b) in this case corresponds to an a point (a, b) ∈ E(k), and the reduced divisor (1, 0) corresponds to the zero point of E (the point at infinity), which is not on the affine model y 2 = x 3 + ax + b. In this case the correspondence between a reduced divisor and a point is very direct. We can regard E(k) as consisting of an affine piece V = {(1, x, y) : y 2 = x 3 + ax + b}, and a zero point (0, 1, 0). When we deal with nonzero points we can simply identify V with the curve y 2 = x 3 + ax + b, which is the principal site of E. The addition map can be described as follows (see [17] ). Let P 1 = (x 1 , y 1 ), P 2 = (x 2 , y 2 ) be two points on V . If x 1 = x 2 and y 1 = −y 2 , then P 1 + P 2 = 0. Otherwise, we can find P 3 = (x 3 , −y 3 ) such that P 1 , P 2 andP 3 = (x 3 , y 3 ) lie on a line y = λx + ν, and we have P 1 + P 2 = P 3 .
(1) If x 1 = x 2 , then λ = y2−y1 x2−x1 and ν = y1x2−y2x1 x2−x1 . (2) If x 1 = x 2 and y 1 = 0, then λ = In both cases
The principal site of the addition map corresponds to Case (1) and consists of (P 1 , P 2 ) ∈ V × V where P 1 = (x 1 , y 1 ), P 2 = (x 2 , y 2 ) and x 1 = x 2 , corresponding to Case (1).
The principal site of the doubling map corresponds to Case (2) and consists of P = (x 1 , y 1 ) ∈ V where y 1 = 0.
Note that for doubling map all but the two torsion points are at the principal site. For D = P 1 − ∞ where P 1 = (x 1 , y 1 ) is not 2-torsion, we have 2D = (h D ) + D ′ where D ′ = P 3 − ∞ with P 3 = (x 3 , y 3 ) given by the formula above,
. Observe that in this situation (h D ) ∞ = 1, therefore for pairing computation we only need to focus on h D as a function on the affine points, namely (x, y) ∈ V .
The degree of the addition map is of degree at least 2 in x 1 , y 1 and in x 2 , y 2 . The degree of the doubling map is of degree at least 2 in x and y as well. However the degree of h D in x (resp. y) is 1. This raises the concern of the possibility of linear attack discussed in § 2.4. To prevent such an attack we consider birational models of y 2 = x 3 + ax + b where the corresponding function for h D is of degree greater than 1 in all variables. We consider one such model
with the birational map ι 1 : . For E 1 , h D is replaced by
where λ ′ = λ(ι 1 (u 1 , u 2 )) = 3u 2 1 + a 2 αu 2 1 βu1+γu2 = (3u 2 1 + a)(βu 1 + γu 2 ) 2αu 2 1 ν ′ = ν(ι 1 (u 1 , u 2 )) == (−u 3 1 + au 1 + 2b)(βu 1 + γu 2 ) 2αu 2 1 We see that h E1 D1 (x 1 , x 2 ) is of the form A(u 1 , u 2 , x 1 , x 2 )/B(u 1 , u 2 , x 1 , x 2 ) where A is of degree 2 in x 1 and x 2 and degree 4 in u 1 and u 2 , and B is of degree 2 in x 1 and x 2 and degree 3 in u 1 and u 2 .
Let m : E × E → E be the addition map as described above for the principal site. Then the addition map m 1 :
For (x 1 , y 1 , x 2 , y 2 ) at the principal site where (x 1 , y 1 ) ∈ E 1 and (x 2 , y 2 ) ∈ E, write m 1 (x 1 , y 1 , x 2 , y 2 ) = (x 3 , y 3 ), then the formula for x 3 and y 3 as rational functions in x 1 , y 1 , x 2 , y 2 can be similarly worked out. The function describing x 3 has the form F/G where F (x 1 , y 1 , x 2 , y 2 ) is of total degree 7, of degree 5 in x 1 , y 1 , of degree 5 in x 2 , y 2 , and G(x 1 , y 1 , x 2 , y 2 ) is of total degree 6, of degree 4 in x 1 , y 1 , and of degree 4 in x 2 , y 2 . The function describing y 3 has the form F/G where F (x 1 , y 1 , x 2 , y 2 ) is of total degree 16, of degree 11 in x 1 , y 1 , of degree 11 in x 2 , y 2 , and G(x 1 , y 1 , x 2 , y 2 ) is of total degree 15, of degree 10 in x 1 , y 1 , of degree 10 in x 2 , y 2 .
Similarly Let τ : E → E be the doubling map as described above for the principal site. Then the doubling map τ 1 : E 1 → E 1 for E 1 is i −1 1 • τ • (i 1 , i 1 ). For (x, y) at the principal site of τ where (x, y) ∈ E 1 , write τ 1 : (x, y) = (x ′ , y ′ ), then the formula for x ′ and y ′ as rational functions in x, y can be similarly worked out. The function describing x ′ has the form F/G where F (x, y) is of total degree 6, and G(x, y) is of total degree 2. The function describing y ′ has the form F/G where F (x, y) is of total degree 15, and G(x, y) is of total degree 11.
Perform a random birational transformation ι 2 : E 1 → E 2 as described in § 2.5 and suppose ι −1 2 (z) = (L 1 (z), L 2 (z)) for z = (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ), where L 1 and L 2 are randomly chosen linear forms over K. Suppose z, z ′ ∈ E 2 , and let D z = z − ∞, where z = (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ) and z ′ = (z ′ 1 , z ′ 2 , z ′ 3 ). Then h E2 Dz (z ′ ) is of the form ϕ(z, z ′ ) = A ′ (z, z ′ )/B ′ (z, z ′ ) where A ′ (z, z ′ ) = A(L 1 (z), L 2 (z), L 1 (z ′ ), L 2 (z ′ )) and B ′ (z, z ′ ) = B(L 1 (z), L 2 (z), L 1 (z ′ ), L 2 (z ′ )). Both A ′ and B ′ are likely dense for some degree at least 2 in z and in z ′ , in which case they are both safe for specification. The addition map for E 2 is i −1 2 • m 1 • (i 2 , i 2 ). Similarly the doubling map for E 2 is i −1 2 • τ 1 • (i 2 , i 2 ). The map m 2 (resp. τ 2 ) is defined by 3 rational functions. As they are formed with randomly chosen i 2 , the polynomials describing them are likely dense for some degree at least 2, hence safe for specification.
Therefore, to specify the program forê on E 2 , it is enough to specify O(d) many descent functions with blinded constant factors of a set of 7 rational functions, three functions that define the addition map on E 2 , three functions that define the doubling map, and one function ϕ(z, z ′ ) for defining h E2 Dz (z ′ ). These 7 functions are secret since ι 1 and ι 2 are secret. The O(d) descent functions and maps can be specified properly such that the specification contains no global descent.
Theorem 2. Efficient computation for the blinded pairingê ℓ onÊ[ℓ] can be properly specified, such that the specification does not contain any global descent. More precisely, to specify the program forê, it is enough to specify O(d) many descent functions with blinded constant factors of a set of 7 rational functions. By performing a random secret birational transformation the 7 functions are secret and likely dense for some degree at least 2, in which case the specification is safe from the linear attack described in § 2.4.
Open problems
We summarize several computational problems which are important to the security of the trilinear map discussed in this paper. For simplicity we focus on the elliptic curve case and assume only one secret descent basis is used in the construction instead of two. The discussion naturally extends to the general case of Jacobian varieties of hyperelliptic curves and where two descent bases are used. Let u be a randomly chosen basis of K over k. Suppose E is an elliptic curve defined over K and µ ℓ ⊂ K. Suppose we have formed a birational model E 2 of E as in § 7 such that the two polynomials defining E 2 are dense in degree 2. Moreover the rational function ϕ describing h E2 Dz (z ′ ) for computing e ℓ , and the 6 functions describing the addition map and the doubling map are safe for specification.
We now call E 2 as E and m 2 as m, and τ 2 as τ . As in § 3, we choose a set of N = O(d 2 ) many (0, 1)-matrices M 1 , . . . , M N that span M at d (F ℓ ), so that each M = M i has the following properties:
1. There are exactly two nonzero entries (i, i 1 ) and (i, i 2 ) for row i, for i = 0, . . . , d − 1. Again, we have the following commutative diagram:
Let C = {(i − i 1 mod d, i − i 2 mod d : i = 0, . . . , d − 1}. For (a, b) ∈ C, let I a,b = {i : (i − i 1 , i − i 2 ) = (a, b) mod d}. Let Ω a,b = W I a,b Γ I a,b . By Proposition 11, the set of Ψ i can be specified by specifyingm, making public C, and Ω a,b for every (a, b) ∈ C.
From the published information: D α , D β ∈Ê[ℓ], specifiedm, specifiedτ , specified ϕ • δ, and the set of Ω a,b , (a, b) ∈ C, can u be efficiently determined?
From the above-mentioned published information, together with the set R of quadratic relations on the matrices M i described in § 3, can the trapdoor discrete-log problem on G 3 be solved efficiently?
The following problems that do not involve the pairing computation can be separated out and more narrowly defined. Solving any one of these problems efficiently will break the trilinear map.
1. Assume the birational model E for an elliptic curve, the addition map m :
E ×E → E and the doubling map τ : E → E are safe for specification, andm andτ are properly specified (for the principal sites, each by 3d polynomials of degree O(1) in 3d variables over k). Can u be determined efficiently? 2. A set S of O(d 2 ) subsets of {0, . . . , d−1} is secretly chosen, each subset I is of cardinality Θ(d ǫ ) for some positive constant ǫ < 1. The set of matrices W I Γ I is made public (Γ is the matrix whose i-th row is u σ i for i = 0, . . . , d − 1, and W = Γ −1 ). Can u be determined efficiently? This problem is abstracted as a subproblem from the next problem. 3. The trapdoor discrete logarithm problem as described in § 3, both the generic version, which does not involve A = E, and the version that allows public identity testing, which involves A = E but does not involve pairing. We remark that the generic version can be reduced to solving a system of quadratic polynomials in d O(1) variables. However the best known method for solving such systems has time complexity exponential in the number of variables.
Whether or a not there is a secure trilinear map without a trapdoor is an interesting open problem. The approach in [8] ,which proceeds more closely along the line suggested by Chinburg and does not involve Weil descent, remains to be further investigated. I would especially like to acknowledge the contributions of the following colleagues: Dan Boneh and Amit Sahai for valuable discussions during the early phase of this work; Steven Galbraith for careful reading of the preprint in [8] as well as valuable comments and questions; Steven Galbraith and Ben Smith for valuable comments and questions on a subsequent preprint [9] ; Karl Rubin, Shahed Sharif, Alice Silverberg, and Travis Scholl for reading [9] and for many helpful discussions leading up to the current revision.
